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1THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO INTERFERE WITH INTER-STATE
COAMERCE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE POWER.
--- O0---
STATEIMNT OF THE QELSTION.
Article 1, Section S, Clause 3. of the Constitution of the
United States provides that, 'The Congress shall have power to
regulate conmerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States and with the Indian tribes" and the tenth amendment
provides that, .The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited to it by the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or, to the people".
Among the powers so reserved to the States is the police
power. Now in order to effectually exercise this power it
is frequently necessary for a State to enact legislation which
incidentally interferes with commerce among the States. Here
then is an apparent overlapping of powers. Which shall prew-
Vail ? The fact that the constitution provides in Art. 6,
Sea.2, that, "This Constitution,........shall be the supreme
Sea. of the an.sdaebetesurm
law of the land . o .......... anything in the Constitution or laws
of' any State to the contrary notwithstanding," does not solve
the difficulty; for here we are confronted with a quest ion of'
construction. The clause of the Constitution last referred
Ia
to cannot be called in imtil it is ascertained what the phrase
" regulate commerce " means; for otherwise the scope of the
Constitution would be broadened each time a question of' on-
struction presented itself. The natural neaninf og the
words must be adopted. But what is their natural meaning
as they are used ? Evidently a limited construction must
be placed upon them, or the p~lice power of the State must
suffer a limitation.
The question therefore is, is State police legislation
which inaidentally interferes with conmmerce among the States
unconstitutional as a regulation of comerce ?
WHAT IS TIE POLICE POWER?
The first question to be disposed of is, what is the
police power and what sort of legislation springs from it ?
The phrase "police power" has two popular meanings, one a
broad and general meaning and the other a narrow and limited
one. Under the broad meaning falls all the legislation which
a State is capable of passing, and under the other comes a
class of legislation which is intended to protect health and
2life, to promote happiness, to preserve quiet and to guard
against the evils of vice, disease, pauperism, erime &a. The
phrase will be used in its latter sense in this paper.
TH POLICE POWER SUPRE!M IN THE.STATE.
The purpose of this paper is to show that this branch of
the general police power has suffered no limitation by reason
of the grant to Congress of power to regulate eommerce mong
the States. It is unprofitable to look back into history
r
very minutely to find the meaning of this clause. But it is
important to note that one of the main causes leading up to
the adoption of the Constitution of the United States was the
fact that Congress under the Articles of Confederation had not
the power to regulate *&=merce. Prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, each State had the power to regulate commerae
between itself and other States as it saw fit. This it did
by means of the exercise of its general police power under
which it imposed taxes directly on imports from other States
for revem=u purposes. The States retaliated in this manner
one against another to aueh an extent as to operAte as a great
restrict ion on trade. a )
Now the intent of the fram~ers of the Constitution in
(a) Laws of N. y. :I74 ch.'!.: Laws of Ct. l738-. oh.-.
3in drawing this clause probably was to guard against this sort
of legislation, to prevent the States from regulating commerce
There is nothing to show that it was the intent to take from
the States the right, toaffbdt inter-state commerce where it
is necessary to a legitimate exercise of the police power.
This would be unreasonable. For to take from the State the
right to produce these remote and incidental effects would
rob the State of the police power itself. This was not in-
tended. The police power is one of the essential powers of
the State. Without it she would be defenseless, and unable
to protect herself against the evils and dangers Which might
invade her borders.
Speaking of a police law the Yansas Court in Railway v
Finley 28 Kansas - says, "If this law is not constitutional,
and within the police power of the Stca, then tke State is
absolutely powerless to protect the property of its citizens.
If this and similar statutes are in oonfliat with t.-e Consti-
tution of t1'e United States, the State is wholly disarmed and
defenseless to exclude from the State tlat ic is dangerous
and injurious to the property of' its citizens".
The police power was not transferred to Contrss. There
is no clause of the Cdnstitutidn which has this eff *t. It
4has been claimed that the 14th amendment in declaring that no
State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws", had this
effect. But the case of Barbier v Connolly 113 U.S. 27 holds
that the 14th amendment does not take from the State any of
its plice power.
Therefore we would conclude that the police power still
resides in the States, and that legislation striatly within
this power is constitutional regardless of the extent to which
it interferes with inter-state. commerce.
But there has been a mass of litigation bearing more or
less directly upon the question. An examination of some of
the leading cases will follow.
STATE OF THE LAW.
The cases which arise under- this clause naturally fall
under three general classes.
1 I. Cases where the statute whose constitutionality is in
question is a direct regulation of inter-state commerce and
not in any sense a police regulation.
2. Cases where the statute oversteps the police power,
where it is only partly a police regulation and as a whole
5interferes with inter-state commerce.
3. Cases where the statute is strictly a p~liee regulat-
ion and interferes with inter-state commerce.
CLASS I
This class establishes the following propositions:
1. The right of Congress to regulate commerce among the
States is exclusive of direct State interference.
2. Silence on the part of Congress in regard to subjects
of Oonmerce National in their nature and admitting of an un-
iform system of rules and regulations, indicates that Congress
desires connerce in those subjects to remain free an& untram-
rie l led.
3. Silence on the part of Congress in regard to subjects
of commerce local in their nature not admitting of an uniform
system of rules and regulations but rather requiring a mul-
titude of systems indicates that Congress is willing the
States should act, so long as it remains silent.
In Gibbon v Ogden,9 Wheaton I, the question was before
the court as to how far the right of the United States to reg-
ulate commerce was exclusive. A statute of the State of New
York gave to Robert Livringstone and Robert Fulton the exclusive
right to navigate the waters of the State of New York with
6boats moved by fire or steam. It was held void so far as it
prohibited United States vessels licensed according to United
States laws navigating said waters. The court declared the
right of Congress to regulate commerce to be complete in it-
self, and to acknowledge no limitations other than t1ose pre-
scribod in the Constitution.
The case of Brown v Maryland 12 Wheaton 436, is a sim-
ilar one. Here the State of Marylend passed a statute re-
quiring an importer to take out a license and pay $50. before
he should be permitted to sell a package of imported goods.
The statute was held unconstitutional as being an encroach-
ment upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce. See
also Robbins v Shelby Taxing District 120 U.S. 489.
In the case of Wabash &c R.R. v Illinois. 118 3.S.557,571
the court haod before it a statute of Illinois which forbade
railroad companies to charge more for a short distance than
for a greater. It held the statute void as an interference
with inter-state commerce.. Clearly the subject was one of
National importance as the statute applied to roads running
out of the State as well as those wholly within the State, and
C ongr e ss had r ema ined s il ent.
The opinion in the above case quotes with approval the
7following extract from Hall v DeCuir 95 U.S.485, " But we
think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks
to impose a direct burden upon inter-state commerce or to
interfere directly with its freedom does encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consider-
ation, in our opinion, occupies that position ............ It
was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in
the Constitution was adopted".
That silence on the part of Congress in regard to inter-
state commerce where the subject is of local importance will
be construed as an implied consent to the States to act umtil
Congress does, is shown by the case of County of Mobile v Kim-
ball 102 U.S.691-696, A statute was before the court entit-
tied, "An Act to provide for the improvement of the river, bay
and harbor of Mobile!' The statute was held valid. The
court said, "Inaction of Congress upon these subjects of a
local nature or operation, unlike its inaction upon matters
affecting all the States and requiring uniformity of regulat-
ion, is 16t to 1 tkenas a deelaration that nothing shall
be done with respect to them, but is rather to be deemed a
declaration that for the time being and until it sees fi t
act they may be regulated by State authori.ty".
8CLASS II
This class of oases establishes the following proposition:
State statutes which as a whole affect inter-state com-
merce will be held valid so far as their provisions are neces-
ary to accomplish a police purpose, that is, so far as they
do not overstep legitimate police power.
Some courts have drawn a distinction between health and
inspection laws on the one hand and other police laws on the
ether, holding that the former are valid and the latter void
when they interfere with inter-state commerce. The distinct-
ion is not of importance. Health and inspection laws are
police laws, but so are many others as well, and it is not
dezirable to make any d~stinction between them for our purpose,
In the case of Henderson v Mayor of New York City 92 U.S.
259, a statute of New York was declared void whiah required
of ship-masters a burdensome bond, or an alternative sum of
money as a pre-requisite to his landing his passengers. The
intention of the statute was, undoubtedl r to protect the
State against the importation of paupers. But it imposed
the burden indiscriminately upon all passengers. This case
is often quoted as sustaining the proposition that police laws
affecting comnmerce are void. But the case does not sustain
the proposition. The case holds that where a State statute
consists of various provisions some of which are police in
their nature, and the others are not but operate as a direct
interference with commerce, the statute is wholly void if the
valid part cannot be enforced without the void part. This
statute was not within the police power but was in excess of
it, as the burden extended to the desirable as well as to the
undesirable passengers. The court says, "The portions of
New Ybkkstatute whi h 'aon6(w. p eon whO on inspset ion, -are
fOUnd--to belong to these classes, are not properly before us,
because the relief sought is as to the part of the statute
applicable to all passengers alike, and is the only relief
which can be given on this bill1l. Whether in the absence of
such (Congressional) action, the States can, or how far they
can, by appropriate legislation, protect themselves against
actual paupers, vagrants, criminalst and diseased persons,
arriving in their territory from foreign countries, we do not
decide.
The case of Chy Lung v Freeman 92 U3.S. 275 is like the
Henderson case. The court in deciding it says,"Warno
called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right
of a State in the absence of' legis~ation by Congress to protect
10
herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and con-
victed criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the defilnit6c
limit of such right, if it exist. Such a right can only
arise from a vital necessity for its exercise and cannot bO
carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a state
statute limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to
that object alone, shall in a proper controversy come before
us, it will be time enough to decide that question. The
statute of California goes far beyond what is necessary or
even appropriate for this purpose, as to be wholly without
any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed
to be justified".
In the case of Railroad v Husen 95 U.S.465, a statute of
Missouri was before the court which prohibited Texan, Mexican
or Indian cattle to be driven into the State of Missouri be-
tween the months of February and November each year. This
act was designed to keep diseased catt16 out of the State but
its effect was to keep out healthy cattl, as well. It was
not a reasonable police regulation. So far as it overstepped
the police power it was a direct regulation of eommneree under
guise of police power~ and was properly declared void, on
page 472, the court says, "While we unhesitatingly admit that
11
a State'A$ass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of
life, liberty and health, or property within its borders;
while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under Oon-
tagious or infectious diseases or convicts etc., from entering
the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may
establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may
not interfere with transportation into or through the State,
beyord which is absolutely necessary for its self-protection.
It may not under cover of its police power substantially pro-
hibit or burden eithet foreign and inter-state commerce".
And on page 473 the court continues, "Tried by this rule, the
statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion upon the exclusive
domain of Congress..........Such a statute we do not doubt is
beyond the power of the State to enact".
Bowman v Chicago R.R. 125 U.S. 465 is a case of this
class. A statute of Iowa forbade common carriers to carry
intoxicating liquors into the State from any other State or
Territory unless furnished with a cirtificatd of the auditor
of the county certifying that the consignee was authorized to
sell. The law was declared unconstitutional because it camne
in~conflict with the right of Congress to regulate comnerce.
This case is often cited 'as holding that police laws are void
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when they interfere with Inter-state commerce.. In fact the
particular section before the court was not a police law at
all. The court speaks as follows at page 498, "The section
of the statute of Iowa, the validity of which is drawn in
question in this case does not fall within this enumeration
of legitimate exertions of the police power........It is, on
the other hand, a regulation directly affecting inter-state
commerce in an essential and vital point. If authorized in
the present instance upon the grounds and motives of the pol-
icy which have dictated it, the same reason would justify any
and every other State regulation of inter-state cormeroe upon
any grounds and reason which might prompt in particular cases
their adoption. It is, therefore, a regulation of that
character which constitutes an unauthorized interference with
the power given to Congress over the subject".
Failing to'keep liquor out of the State by the statute
just considered, the legislature of the State of 2v. passed
another intended to accomplish the same purpose but not in
terms prohibiting importation. The statute passed for the
purpose prohibited the sale of intQxicating liquor except for
certain purposes unless the seller first obtained a license
from a County Court of the State. The statute by pro-
hibiting the sale within the State, of course, defeated the
object of importation and consequently operated as a pro-
hilition on importation.
The case of Leisy v Hardin 135 U.S.I00 came up under this
statute. The facts were substantially as follows: Leisy, the
plaintiff, was a resident of Peoria,Ill., and from that place'
shipped to his agent in Keokuk, Idwa a quantity of intoxicat-
ing liquor. Hardin, the defendent, a constable, seized the
liquor while it was exposed for sale by the agent. Replevin
was brought against the constable and was held maintainable,
the law under which sale was forbidden being held unconsti-
tutional when applied to a sale of imported liquor still in
the original package. The reasons assigned for its uncon-
stitutionality were the samre substantially that were given in
the Bowman case. The section of the law in question when apa
plied to imported liquor was not adapted to accomplish a
police purpose, and it operated as a direct regulation of
inter-state commerce and of course iwas void. But the court
did not decide that the statute was void when applied to
liquors which had once become incorporated into the gen-
eral mass of property within the State, that is to say to
liquors which had lost their inter-state commercial character.
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In fact the court had already decided in Mugler v Kansas 103
U.S.623 that a similar statute when applied to sales of liq-
uor which had become so incorporated was constitutional.
But returning to the Leisy case. The.statute was held
void because it was an umjustifiable interference with inter-
state cormaerce. Taking the two cases together, the Leisy
case and the Mugler aase, it is easy to see how the former
might be misunderstood. In the Mugler case, so long as the
statute did not interfere with inter-state comnerce it was
held constitutional, and in the Leisy caseas soon as the
statute did interfere with irter-st:ate oommerce it was held
unconstitutional.
There is a peculiarity growing out of the nature of the
subject matter in question which gives rise to this misunder-
standing. Police measures fdiffer with different articles
according as the articles are more or less dangerous. That
intoxicating liquor is dangerous is unquestioned. That it
is a sound article of commerce is also unquestioned. Now
how dangerous is it and what regulations are necessary in
order to prevent the evils which it produces? Intoxicating
liquor is d argerous onl~y when it is consumed as a beverage.
The evils it produces all follow its consunrption. It is not
15
dangerous to handle,not dangerous as an article of eommerce,
and not dangerous to ship it into the State or to sell it in
the original package. So a law prohibiting importation, or
sale in original package, although its ostensible purpose is
the prevention of the evils of intemperance within the borders
of the State, is a regulation of commerce and not a police
law at all. Police laws on the subject are unnecessary until
after the liquor has lost its inter-state commercial character.
Had the subject matter been 4amie.0Or chQle -infected
rags, there is no question but that a like or dven more severe
regulation would have been upheld regardless of interference
with inter-state commerce. The difference between the two
cases is one of fact and not of prinaile.
The following cases are in point: Minnesota v Barber I56
U.S.313; Commonwealth v Huntley 30 N.E.II87; State v Gooch
44 Fed. 276; In Re Worthen 58 Fed. 467; Bangor v Smith. 83 Me.
422; Grimes v Eddy 27 S.W. 479;
01ASS XI!
This class of cases sustains the following proposition:
State statutes strictly within the police power are con-
st itutional regardless of the extent to which they affet
inter, state cormerce.
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No case of this class has yet reached the Supreme Court
of the United States, so we will examine the decisions that
have been rendered in the other courts.
In State v Railroad 24 W. Va. 783, a statute was before
the court which was recognized to be botha police regulation
and an interference with inter-state commerce. The statute
forbadle any person to wotk at their regular calling on Sunday
except those engaged in works of necessity or charity and
those engaged in transporting the mails or passengers or their
baggage. The statute was sustained and the opinion contains
the following, "It was intended for and was only an internal
police law and though it may have some incidental effect upon
the inter-state cormerce carried on by the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Co., that fact according to all the authorities does
not make such a law unconstitutional as regulating inter-state
commerce; for it does not regulate it in the constitutional
sense of the term........ it is a misnomer to call the exercise
of such.police power, because it may or does affect inter-
state commerce, a regulation of commerce between the States".
The next case on the subject was Norfolk v :ommonwealth
88 Va. 95. The constitutional.:ity of a statute of the sse
nature was in question. The statute was held unconstitution-
17
al as a regulation of commerce, although it was admitted to
be a reasonable police regulation. The case is wrongly
decided and is entirely out of Line with the drift of judicial
opinion. There is not a case, State or Federal, which has
followed it as authority, and that it is unsupported by
authority will appear by an examination of the authorities
upon which it relies. None of the cases cited are exactly
in point. Each one falls within one or the other of the two
classes of cases already considered. The attempt made to
distinguish the West Virginia case was unsuccessful.
Hennington v State 90 Ga. 396 considering the consti-
tutionality of a similar statute said, "Nor is the statute a
regulation of commerce. It applies alike to all business,
vocations and occupations. It concerns the general police
of the State and of all interests, whether agricultural,
mechanical or manufacturing, comnercial, professional, or what
not. It is universal, and rigidly impartial, making no dis-
crimination whayever for or against commerce or anything else.
.......Trade may go on when anything else can; it stops unly
when, and so long as,there is a complete suspension of worldly
enteTrtse and activity. It is required to take no rest
which is not appointed for everything else to take",
is
The statute was held constitutional as a legitimate police
regulation.
In Burdick v People 36 N.E.948, a statute was under con-
dideration which forbade persons to sell steamboat tickets
without having a cirtificate of authority from the company to
sell. The statute was held constitutional, the court saying,
" It is held by the Supreme Court of the United States that
inter-state commerce, the regulation of which is within the
exclusive power of Congress, includes inter-state transportat-
ion of passengers. But the deposit in Congress of the power
to regulate commerce between the States was not intebded to
deprive the States of their police power. Under its police
power a State may legislate to promote domestic order, morals,
and safety; to protect lives, limbs, quiet, and property of
all persons within the State; to secure the general comfort,
health, and property of the State; to provent crimepauperism,
disturbance of the peace and all forms of social evils. The
State cannot invade the domain of the National government or
assume powers belonging to CQngress...... But many acts of a
State may affect or influence commerce without amount ing to a
regulation of it. state legislation which is not an obstacle
to inter-state commuerce and imposes no burden upon it and
which comes within the proper exercise of the police power is
not unconstitutional as infringing upon the powers of Congress,
In Minnesota R.R. v 1Milner 57 Fed. 276, a statute which
provided for the detention and disinfection immigrants was
held valid. The statute made no disorimination. The
healthy were detained as well as the diseased. The statute
was similar in nature to the one held void in Henderson v
Mayor et. al. supra. The latter however was so extreme a
measure as to deemed an unreasonable exercise of police power.
To establish the reasonableness of the statute in the present
case the court says, "To the objection that passengers from
non-infected countries and localities are detained the answer
is that sueh detentions are in the nature of the case, to a
certain extent, unavoidable; and passing from skeh countries
and localities may have become properly subject to such de-
tention by reason of having mingled with others who would
commrmicate pestilence and disease to which they themselves
had been exposed or subject........The inconvenience result-
ing to immigrants and travelers fromn being halted and sub-
jected to examination and detention at State lines is of
trifling importance at a time when every effort is required
and is being put forth to prevent the introduction and spread
20
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of pestilential and communicable diseases.
Our treatment of this question would be incomplete um-
less we referred to the case of Walling v Michigan 116 U.S._446.
A statute was before the court which forbade the sale of im-
ported liquor but permitted the sale of liquor of domestic
manufacture to continue4  It was held void for two reasons:
(I) It deprived citizens of the United States of equal pro-
tection of the laws and (2) It was a regulation of inter-state
commerce. This case has been cited as authority for the
statement that police regulations are void when they affect
inter-state commerce. The case is not authority for the
statement because this police regulation not only affected
commerce but it also violated the 14th amendment. The law
might have been held valid had the only objection to it been
that it inciddnty affected inter-state commerce. It is
impossible to say which is the controlldng reason in the deciso
ion, and consequently cases of its kind are not authority
against the proposition last laid down.
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CONCLUSIONS.
I. The right of Congress to regulate commerce among the
States is exclusive od direct State interference.
2. Silence on the part of Congress in regard to subjects
of commerce National in their character and admitting of an
imiform system of rules and regulations, indicates that
Congress desires commerce in those subjects to remain free
and untrammelled.
3. Silence on the part of Congress in regard to
subjects of commerce local in their nature not admitting of
an uniform system of rules and regulations but rather requir-
ing a multitude of systems indicates that Congress is willing
the States should act, so long as it remains silent.
4. State statutes which as a whole affect inter-state
commerce will be held valid so far as their provisions are
necessary to accomplish a police purpose, that is, so far as
they do not overstep legitimate police power, regardless of
the extent to which they affect inter-state commerce.
5. State statutes strictly within the police power are
constitutional regardless of the extent to which they affect
inter-state commerce.

